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  This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, 
but unlike previous studies that focus on total demand, participation is disaggregated into en-
trants and those exiting. Modeling entry and exit decisions separately illustrates that the effect 
of a given variable is often muted by aggregation. In addition, the approach in this paper dis-
tinguishes between price and yield variables rather than total returns and is consequently able 
to demonstrate that price variables are particularly important for farmers considering enrolling 
in crop insurance, while yield variables and other risk management opportunities are more im-
portant for farmers who have been in the program but are deciding to exit. The result suggests 
that moral hazard is reduced significantly by calculating the coverage yield level for an indi-
vidual producer on the basis of a moving average of past yields for that farmer. While yield 
and its variance are particularly influential in the participation decision for farmers currently 
enrolled, its significant impact on the insurance decision for all farmers highlights the impor-
tance of crop insurance as a potential adaptation strategy to weather events. 
 
  Key Words: crop insurance, entry and exit, panel data 
 
 
Farmers increasingly are relying on crop insur-
ance as a risk management tool that replaces gov-
ernment stabilization programs. Previous studies 
on the demand for crop insurance have not exam-
ined how the demand factors vary between those 
farmers currently enrolled in the program and 
those farmers without crop insurance. Past re-
search on crop insurance participation has relied 
on aggregate state- or county-level data over a pe-
riod of time or on a specific micro-level survey 
for a given period. Examples of the former in-
clude Goodwin and Smith (1995), Goodwin (1993), 
Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan (1990), Hojjatti and 
Bockstael (1988), Gardner and Kramer (1986), 
and Nieuwoudt et al. (1985). These time series 
studies generally estimate the proportion of eligi-
ble area within a region that is insured as a func-
tion of factors such as expected return to insur-
ance and demographic/physical characteristics of 
the region that proxy alternative risk management 
options. Studies of the latter sample individual 
farmers at a given point in time and examine the 
decision to participate and the corresponding 
level of coverage as a function of socioeconomic 
and farm characteristics of the producer (i.e., 
Sherrick et al. 2004, Garrido et al. 2002, and Coble 
et al. 1996). None of the studies have used panel 
data to examine the drivers of exit and entry deci-
sions in a crop insurance plan. 
  This paper decomposes demand into not only 
total participation but also the number of farmers 
who enter and exit a crop insurance program, and 
in the process illustrates that the effect of a given 
variable is often muted by the aggregation. While 
previous studies help us understand the factors 
that matter for all farmers enrolled in a crop in-
surance program, they offer limited information 
to understand how the same factors might influ-
ence the dynamic decisions of new entrants or 
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dropouts. For instance, previous studies have 
found that the demand for crop insurance is 
highly inelastic with respect to premium rates. 
Since these studies agglomerate all participating 
farmers, these models are not well-suited to cap-
ture any differential effect that premium rates 
might have on those farmers purchasing insur-
ance for the first time versus those currently en-
rolled and considering continuing or canceling 
their policies. This study also finds own price 
demand to be inelastic for all farmers, but the 
decomposition also shows that demand is much 
more elastic for farmers considering enrolling in 
crop insurance. 
  Similarly, the effect of previous yield realiza-
tions and yield variability has remained relatively 
unexplored in the crop insurance literature, with 
the exception of Goodwin (1993). Both previous 
realizations and variance of crop yield are im-
portant variables because they represent one of 
the most tangible pieces of information regarding 
the risk profile of the farm enterprise. In addition, 
growing conditions in the previous crop year can 
have confounding effects on the likelihood of 
using crop insurance as a risk management strat-
egy in the present year. For example, in the case 
of unfavorable weather events, lower yields are 
more likely to generate an indemnity payout from 
the crop insurance company and thus clearly il-
lustrate the benefit of an insurance plan to a 
farmer. However, the lower yields reduce the 
moving average on which future payouts to the 
farmer are based and consequently the likelihood 
of such payouts. More importantly, the relative 
effect of previous yield realizations and perceived 
variability of yield might depend on whether the 
farmer is a new entrant or has purchased uninter-
rupted coverage in the past. Knowing the drivers 
of entry and exit decisions is not only important 
to evaluate the viability of a crop insurance pro-
gram, but also an important piece of information 
to understand how program design might prevent 
or encourage farmer opportunistic behavior due 
to the information asymmetry inherent in these 
contracts. 
  The objective of this paper is twofold: first, to 
decompose farmer participation in a crop insur-
ance program into exit and entry decisions; and 
second, to disentangle the effect of previous yield 
realizations on the demand for crop insurance. In 
the first component we investigate how the dif-
ferent types of decision makers (e.g., new en-
trants and dropouts) respond to the same set of 
economic, risk, and county-specific variables. In 
the second component, we examine whether an 
increase in previous yield has a greater effect on 
farmers opting out of the programs or farmers 
joining a program, and the implications for pro-
gram design given the information asymmetry 
underlying these programs. 
  An understanding of the dynamics of participa-
tion in a crop insurance program is fundamental 
for delivering agencies to tailor their attention to 
the different types of clients they are serving. 
Moreover, a dynamic view of participation helps 
crop insurance providers to implement better 
strategies and allocate promotional funds to retain 
current clients and encourage the signing up of 
new clients. Disentangling the impact of previous 
yield realizations is of particular importance for 
policymakers, who allocate government funding, 
and farmer organizations, which seek to advise 
members on potential adaptation strategies 
against climate change. For instance, if increased 
yield variability leads to an increased participa-
tion in the programs, the delivering agency needs 
to proactively plan ways to manage the poten-
tially higher financial exposure. Moreover, an 
increased demand for crop insurance would sug-
gest that taxpayer money might be more effi-
ciently allocated to strengthen and enhance these 
programs in lieu of ad hoc payments to farmers. 
  The remainder of the paper is as follows. The 
next section provides a brief survey of the previ-
ous literature on crop insurance participation and 
identifies the main factors that might influence 
enrollment decisions. After an overview of the 
literature, a conceptual framework is developed to 
conjecture different hypotheses regarding partici-
pation. In the two sections following that, the 
modeling strategy and estimation procedures are 
discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion 
on policy implications for crop insurance provid-




A large body of literature has examined the fac-
tors underlying farmer participation in crop insur-
ance programs. These studies approach insurance 
decisions at the aggregate level over time [see for 
example the work of Goodwin and Smith (1995), 94    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Goodwin (1993), Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan 
(1990), Hojjatti and Bockstael (1988), Gardner 
and Kramer (1986), and Nieuwoudt et al. (1985)] 
or at the micro level for a single period [see Sher-
rick et al. (2004), Sherrick (2003), Mishra and El-
Osta (2002), Jose and Valluru (1997)]. From this 
literature has emerged a set of factors that influ-
ence decisions to purchase crop insurance such as 
farmer-specific characteristics (e.g., education, risk 
attitude, off-farm income), economic factors (e.g., 
crop returns, insurance premium), and farm-/re-
gion-specific characteristics (e.g., crop mix, loca-
tion, soil quality). The empirical relationships es-
tablished within these studies help us understand 
the total enrollment of farmers in a crop insurance 
program. However, there is not an empirical ex-
amination, to the best of our knowledge, of how 
the same factors might affect the different type of 
participants that simultaneously determine the 
overall participation, namely new entrants and 
dropouts. 
  The present paper complements the literature 
on crop insurance demand by decomposing crop 
insurance participation into entry and exit deci-
sions. Clearly, the year-to-year change in partici-
pation rates is composed of three types of farm-
ers: those who join the system (i.e., returning and 
new entrants), those who after joining the system 
decide to continue their enrollment, and those 
who drop out. This paper will focus on the deci-
sions of farmers who join and exit the plan. While 
the factors influencing the three levels of crop 
insurance participation might be the same, the 
impact of each factor on each type of decision 
might be different. For instance, the crop insur-
ance premium might be more important for farm-
ers facing the initial participation decision than 
for farmers considering the dropout decision. 
  In addition, this study complements Goodwin’s 
(1993) effort to establish the impact of previous 
year’s yield on the decision to purchase insurance 
in future periods. While Goodwin establishes that 
higher yields in the preceding year are inversely 
related to the demand for crop insurance, his 
analysis does not establish whether the higher 
demand is due to new purchases of insurance or 
lower cancellation of policies. In this paper we 
disentangle those effects and discuss the implica-
tions for dealing with potential asymmetry that 
occurs in crop insurance contracts. For instance, 
experiencing a considerable number of dropouts 
after experiencing poor yield conditions in the 
previous period might indicate that farmers 
participating in the crop plan might not consider 
insurance a “substitute” for the good management 
decisions and effective input applications that 
improve the likelihood of producing a good yield. 
From the perspective of the insurance provider, 
this is a desirable result because it demonstrates 
how the plan design might mute the moral hazard 




Consider a farmer who grows one crop, faces 
yield (Y) risk, and maximizes the expected utility
1 
of profits. Crop yield, in particular, is distributed 
with a mean of E(Y) and variance of var(Y). Let-
ting Pc represent crop price and C the cost of pro-
duction per unit area of production, both of which 
are known at the time of purchasing insurance, 
profits without insurance (πNI) can be expressed 
as 
 
(1)  NI c PY C π =− . 
 
Moreover, the expected utility of profit without 
crop insurance can be expressed in terms of its 
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where  () NI E π is expected profit and var( ) NI π  is 
the variance of profits without insurance. 
  For a premium (PRM), the farmer could use 
crop insurance against yield losses below a 
guaranteed level given by Yg, which is a moving 
average on which future payouts to the farmer are 
based. If the actual yield (Y) is below this cover-
age level (Yg > Y), then the farmer receives an 
indemnity (I), which is the yield difference multi-
plied by the crop price (Pc); I(Yg,Y) = Pc(Yg – Y). 
Profit with insurance (πI) is thus 
 
                                                                                    
1 The conceptual framework assumes, for illustration of the principles 
only, that an exponential utility function with constant absolute risk 
aversion characterizes the decision maker’s risk preferences. This 
assumption facilitates the analysis in terms of certainty equivalent 
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where E(I) and var(I) respectively represent the 
mean and variance of the indemnity. 
  Farmers compare the expected utility of profits 
with and without insurance to make their pur-
chasing decisions. The maximum willingness to 
pay for insurance (PRM*) is equal to the sum of 
money that equates the certainty equivalents of 
profits with and without insurance [equations (2) 
and (4)]. This value is referred to in the literature 
as the reservation premium and is given in equa-
tion (5): 
(5)   * ( ) 0.5 [var( ) 2cov( , )]
*( ) 0 . 5
var( ) 2 var( ) var( ) . IY
PRM E I I I Y
PRM E I






  The reservation premium and values of the CE 
depend on whether the farmer is currently en-
rolled in crop insurance or not. However, certain 
variables will have the same impact on the par-
ticipation decision regardless of previous insur-
ance purchase decisions: 
(6)
*
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A higher level of risk aversion will lead to a 
higher willingness to pay as long as insurance 
produces profits with less variance relative to the 
no-insurance case. Moreover, an increased vari-
ance in crop yield will increase the farmer’s res-
ervation premium due to the built-in hedging ef-
fect on crop insurance (e.g., corrIY < 0). In the case 
of higher crop prices, a higher willingness to pay 
for insurance results when the relative variability 
of the indemnities is not higher than the variance 
of yields and there is a sufficiently high hedging 
effect between the indemnities and yield risk. 
  The effect of previous yield, however, is more 
complex and might depend on previous partici-
pation decisions. For farmers who have been en-
rolled in the crop insurance program, the guaran-
teed yield and corresponding indemnity payments 
are based on the moving average of the farmer’s 
yield reported in the previous years. Therefore, in 
this case, the insurer uses the farmer’s production 
history to write the contracts, and lower (higher) 
crop yields reduce (increase) the moving average 
on which future payouts to a farmer with insur-
ance are based (i.e., ∂Yg/∂Yt – 1 > 0). Therefore, 
changes in past weather events, as embedded in 
crop yield, will have an impact on the reservation 
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An increase in yield during the previous crop year 
will generate benefits in terms of both the ex-
pected payouts, but it can also produce negative 
impacts through an increase in yield variance. In 
particular, the first term in equation (9) will be 
positive since by definition a yield increase must 
not decrease the expected indemnities from the 
insurance via a larger Yg. However, the higher Yg 96    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
will also produce more variance as the indemnity 
and the yield functions overlap more closely. 
Thus, the net impact of the yield increase will 
depend on the sign of the last term of equation 
(9). Specifically, as long as the yield variance 
continues to be greater than the indemnity vari-
ance, and their combination with the hedging 
effect is strong, the yield increase will likely pro-
duce a higher reservation premium. Intuitively, it 
would be irrational for a farmer to engage in the 
insurance contract if the variance of the indemni-
ties were greater than the yield variance, which of 
course would make the last part of equation (9) 
positive and leave the net impact of a yield in-
crease indeterminate. 
  When the farmer is not currently part of the 
crop insurance scheme, the insurer lacks complete 
information about the farmer’s production his-
tory. Consequently, the Yg used to compute the 
indemnity is not a moving average based on the 
farmer’s past yield but rather the county average 
yield. Assuming that the farmer’s yield risk is 
independent of the county average yield, the 
farmer’s yield in the previous year has no impact 
on the coverage level but only in the own vari-
ance of yield. Thus, the impact of the previous 
year’s yield on the reservation premium of a non-
participating farmer (PRM**) can be derived by 
differentiation of equation (5), keeping in mind 

















Since the expected indemnity is not affected by 
last year’s yield [∂E(I)/∂Yt–1 = 0], the sign of 
equation (10) depends on the second term in the 
right-hand side of the expression. Given that in-
surance payouts and yield realizations are nega-
tively correlated by design, the sign will depend 
on how previous yield realizations change the 
variance of the yield distribution. If the change in 
yield is variance-increasing, ∂VarY/∂Yt–1 > 0, 
then the farmer will have a higher reservation 
premium. In summary, non-participating farmers 
will have a greater willingness to pay for insur-
ance when their experience suggests that the 
benefit of higher-yielding crops comes with the 






Previous research on crop insurance has meas-
ured participation using an array of dependent 
variables and methods. Some of the most com-
mon measures include the proportion of area in-
sured in relation to total plantings, liability per 
planted acre (Goodwin 1993), proportion of eli-
gible acres insured, and proportion of eligible 
bushels insured (Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan 
1990). Most studies at the county level have 
measured changes in these participation measures 
across decision units in space, although some 
have combined spatial and time series data. Mi-
cro-level studies have used surveys to ask whether 
farmers use crop insurance or not, and have used 
limited dependent variable regression techniques 
to model the dichotomous choice on participation 
and/or coverage level to farmer characteristics 
(Sherrick et al. 2004, Sherrick 2003, Mishra and 
El-Osta 2002, Jose and Valluru 1997). These mi-
cro studies are at a single point in time, which 
constitutes a shortcoming in the study of dynamic 
crop insurance participation decisions. 
  Data on the crop insurance plan were provided 
by Agricorp, the risk management agency of On-
tario. The data covers the 1988–2004 period for 
eight counties in southern Ontario: Chatham-Kent, 
Elgin, Essex, Haldimand-Norfolk, Huron, Lamb-
ton, Middlesex, and Perth. For each county and 
for any given year within the study period, the 
data set separates the number of soybean farmers 
who moved in and out of the program, the num-
ber of farmers who qualified for insurance claims, 
crop yield, and the monetary amount of the claim. 
For our purposes, however, the most salient fea-
ture of the data set is that it can be used to track 
the dynamic flows that determine the total num-
ber of farmers enrolled in the program at any 
point in time within a county. The measures on 
the movement of farmers in and out of the insur-
ance program are useful in helping to overcome 
the static limitations of previous studies. Cabas, Leiva, and Weersink  Modeling Exit and Entry of Farmers in a Crop Insurance Program   97 
 
 
  Four dependent variables are specified to cap-
ture crop insurance participation within a given 
county: 
 
  (i) the total number of farmers enrolled in 
the plan; 
  (ii) the proportion of soybean acres insured 
(a standard measure in the literature); 
  (iii) the number of farmers enrolling in the 
plan for the first time; and 
  (iv)  the number of farmers canceling their en-
rollment. 
 
Aggregate measure of participation such as (i) 
and (ii) above include all the farmers participating 
in the plan. Such a measure, however, does not 
allow one to distinguish between the type of 
farmer participating in the plan (new vs. existing), 
nor how each type of farmer responds to the same 
exogenous shock. For instance, measures (i) and 
(ii) above are of little use in investigating whether 
the lower total farmer participation associated 
with an insurance premium rate increase is due 
more to existing farmers canceling their policies 
or to fewer new farmers enrolling in the plan. 
Instead, we propose that such a question can be 
answered by decomposing participation in meas-
ures such as (iii) and (iv) proposed above. Using 
this dynamic approach to measure participation 
might be useful not only in investigating whether 
aggregate measures of participation potentially 
mute the impact of an individual demand driver, 
but also in testing to what extent the exit and en-
try decisions are symmetric to a particular shock. 
In addition, the decomposition allows one to in-
vestigate how the design of crop insurance con-
tracts deals with the asymmetric information prob-
lem inherent in yield insurance applications. 
  The averages for the four participation meas-
ures over the 18 years of data are presented at the 
county level in Table 1. In addition, the trend of 
these dependent variables over time is illustrated 
in Figures 1 and 2 for Middlesex County, whose 
patterns closely resemble the mean produced by 
the eight-county sample. The number of soybean 
growers participating in the crop insurance pro-
gram increased significantly from 1990 to 1993 
(see Figure 1). After reaching a peak of 1,000 
farmers in 1993, participation fell to approxi-
mately 900 farmers in 1995, but has fluctuated 
between 900 and 950 farmers since that time. In 
turn, the number of new entrants in the soybean 
plan in Middlesex fell from a peak of 279 pro-
ducers in 1989 to approximately 127 in the fol-
lowing year. The number of new entrants has 
fluctuated between 100 and 200 farmers since 
that time. Moreover, the percentage of soybean 
area insured in Middlesex has increased steadily 
(see Figure 2). The total area harvested almost 
doubled from 110,000 acres (44 percent insured) 
in 1990 to 215,000 (52 percent insured) in 1997. 
Although the soybean acreage has declined since 
1997, the insured acreage has continued to in-
crease to levels exceeding 75 percent of the 
county soybean crop.  
 
Independent Variables Affecting Participation 
 
The factors affecting participation in crop insur-
ance as determined from the theoretical model in 
the previous section are described in Table 2. 
Summary statistics and expected signs for each 
variable on the different participation measures 
are included in Table 3. 
  The premium rate is the price that Ontario 
farmers pay to enroll in the provincial crop insur-
ance program. As explained in the theoretical 
model, farmers purchase crop insurance if their 
reservation premium is greater than the premium 
payment they make to the insurer. As the pre-
mium rate increases, the number of new entrants 
(dropouts) to the crop plan is expected to de-
crease (increase). The producer premium
2 rates 
corresponding to the soybean crop plan were pro-
vided by Agricorp and deflated by the CPI as 
reported by Statistics Canada. 
  The crop price will positively impact the de-
mand for crop insurance if higher crop prices 
increase the mean and variance of the insurance 
payout and the higher price produces indemnities 
whose variability does not exceed yield variabil-
ity [see equation (8)]. As long as the higher insur-
ance payouts remain less variable than the crop 
yield, the reservation premium will increase with 
increases in the soybean price. It is hypothesized 
                                                                                    
2 In Canada, the crop insurance premium is partly subsidized by the 
provincial and federal governments. Although percentage of premium 
subsidized has varied between the 50–60 percent rate, this analysis is 
based on the proportion of the premium rate actually paid by the 
producer.  98    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Crop Insurance Participation Measures by County (1988–2004) (annual average) 
County  Total Insured  % Soybean Area Insured  Entrants  Exits 
Huron 912  70  169  138 
Perth 624  66  126  97 
Haldimand-Norfolk 505  60  109  98 
Middlesex 892  61  163  136 
Lambton 1126 57  160  127 
Elgin 511  57  98  86 
Kent 1785  72  242  224 
Essex 1243  77  158  165 
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Figure 1. Farmer Crop Insurance Participation in Middlesex County (1988–2004) 
 
that an increase in the soybean price has a posi-
tive (negative) effect on the number of new en-
trants (dropouts) in the plan. The soybean price 
used is the provincial annual average collected 
from the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
and Rural Affairs website. It was deflated by the 
CPI. 
  Conversely, the variance in the soybean price 
contributes to the variance of profits and will 
likely result in a reduced reservation premium. If 
soybeans experience an increase in price risk, 
farmers will more likely switch towards crops 
with less volatile prices such as wheat or corn. 
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Figure  2. Soybean Area Harvested and Insured in Middlesex County (1988–2004) 
 
 
cline in the crop insurance participation measures. 
Therefore, an increase in the variance of soybean 
price is expected to decrease (increase) the num-
ber of new entrants into (dropouts from) the crop 
insurance program. The variance of price was 
calculated as a weighted moving average of the 
previous three years.
3 
  Yield in the previous year, which embodies the 
effect of weather conditions, has an ambiguous 
effect on the reservation premium for farmers 
currently enrolled in the crop insurance program 
[see equations (9) and (10)]. If the previous 
year’s yield is high, farmers who purchased in-
surance will feel they lost the payment on the 
insurance premium and may decide to cancel their 
coverage. However, the increase in yield will also 
                                                                                    
3 The subjective variance for prices and yields is assumed to be 
defined in a manner similar to supply response models (i.e., Adesina 
and Brorsen 1987). Specifically, they are defined as follows: 
222
12 1 23 2 34 3 var(p) 0.5{p (p )} 0.33{p (p )} 0.17{p (p )} tt t tt t tt t EEE −− − −− − −− − =− + − + −  
222
12 1 23 2 34 3 var(y) 0.5{y (y )} 0.33{y (y )} 0.17{y (y )} tt t tt t tt t EEE −− − −− − −− − =− + − + − . 
increase the yield moving average on which the 
level of insurance coverage is based. The likeli-
hood of receiving a payout from the program is 
thus increased, as is the farmer’s incentive to re-
main in the program. Lagged yield is expected to 
increase the willingness to pay for insurance 
when the benefit of a potentially higher expected 
indemnity outweighs the disutility of lower or 
variable profits associated with yield reductions. 
In the case of new entrants, previous realizations 
of yield will not affect future payouts. Thus, new 
participants will purchase insurance when they 
feel that yield increases in the past will produce 
more variable yields in the future. 
  Increases in the variance of yield
4 due to 
weather variability will increase the risk premium 
that producers are willing to pay to avoid risk. 
Thus, an increase in the variance of yield might 
be associated with a lower dropout rate, but with 
                                                                                    
4 Please refer to footnote 3. 100    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of Explanatory Variables 
Affecting Crop Insurance Participation 
Notation Variable  Definition 
PREMIUM  Average of the provincial producer-paid real 
premium rate for the soybean plan ($/acre)  
PRICE  Real November futures price of soybeans 
adjusted for exchange rate and moving 
weighted average 
PRICEVAR  Variance of the expected soybean price 
YIELD  County soybean yield in preceding year 
(bushels/acre) 
YIELDVAR  Variance of county yield 
CLAIMS  Number of farmers qualifying for insurance 
payout in the preceding year 
SOYPROP   Proportion of total acreage devoted to 
soybeans at the county level 
 
 
Table 3. Summary Measures and Expected 







PREMIUM 7.92  2.28  -  + 
PRICE 6.67  1.39  + - 
PRICEVAR     -  + 
YIELD 36.87  4.65  +  - 
YIELDVAR     +  - 
CLAIMS 347  327 +  - 
SOYPROP 0.48  0.12  +  - 
 
 
a higher number of new farmers signing up for 
the plan. 
  The number of farmers receiving an insurance 
payout is also expected to have a positive (nega-
tive) sign in participation (number of dropouts). 
The indemnity is the most tangible benefit for a 
farmer participating in the crop insurance program. 
For those farmers who are considering whether to 
participate or not, the increase in the number of 
beneficiaries has a “neighborhood effect,” and 
thus encourages participation. Similarly, for those 
already in the system, the indemnity confirms 
their expectations and benefits of their insurance 
decisions; therefore, a higher number of indemni-
ties should be associated with a lower number of 
dropouts. 
  The proportion of area planted with soybeans is 
expected to have a positive (negative) effect on 
crop insurance participation (exits). Diversifica-
tion is a non-commercial management tool that 
farmers can implement to reduce risk. As the rela-
tive proportion of area planted with soybeans 
increases, the average crop farm is becoming less 
diversified, and consequently there is a greater 
need for a commercial yield risk management tool 
such as crop insurance. Moreover, this variable 
controls for the relative importance of the crop 
within the crop portfolio. In other words, if farm-
ers allocate more land to other crops, then they 
will likely use their limited risk management 




Combining cross-sectional and time series data 
provides additional information on the economic 
behavior across the different decision units, but it 
also raises issues on how the unobservable het-
erogeneity across counties should be accounted 
for in the model. The panel nature of the data can 
be estimated using either a fixed effects model, 
which controls for omitted variables that differ 
between counties but are constant over time, or a 
random effects model, which considers that some 
omitted variables may be constant over time but 
vary between cases or vice versa. The type of 
assumption made about the source of heterogene-
ity has important implications for the econometric 
estimation.
5 
  A Breusch and Pagan test and a Hausman 
specification test were used to determine if a 
fixed effects or a random effects approach should 
be used to model the three participation equa-
tions.
6 A random effects model was rejected as 
the appropriate means of estimating the panel 
data on the basis of the Breusch and Pagan La-
grangian multiplier test for the four models. The 
Hausman test produced similar conclusions. There-
fore, the insurance participation functions were 
                                                                                    
5 The data were tested for unit roots using the multivariate augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (MADF) test for panel data proposed by Sarno and 
Taylor (1998). Based on the MADF test, the null hypothesis of joint 
non-stationarity was rejected for all the data in the model. Test results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
6 The specific tests are available from the authors upon request. Cabas, Leiva, and Weersink  Modeling Exit and Entry of Farmers in a Crop Insurance Program   101 
 
 
estimated using a fixed panel model or a least 
squares dummy variable estimation approach. This 
model assumes that each county has a unique but 
constant source of variation and that the source of 




The estimated coefficients for the exogenous 
variables in the fixed effects panel model are 
listed in Table 4 for the four models of insurance 
participation. The corresponding elasticities are 
listed in Table 5. The overall fit of insurance par-
ticipation models are good with adjusted R
2 val-
ues of approximately 0.88, 0.70, 0.66, and 0.55 
for the four models, respectively. In addition, 
most of the variables are statistically significant 
and of the expected sign. 
  The demand for insurance is inversely related 
to its price as expected and consistent with 
downward-sloping demand curves found in other 
crop insurance participation models (Goodwin 
1993, Cannon and Barnett 1995). Increases in the 
premium rate decrease the number of entrants and 
increase the number of dropouts (columns 4 and 5 
of Table 4). The statistical significance of the 
insurance premium on the entry/exit numbers ver-
sus its insignificant effect on the total number of 
farmers with soybean insurance demonstrates the 
value of decomposing the participation decision. 
At an aggregate level, the cost of insurance does 
not appear to influence overall participation (col-
umns 2 and 3 of Table 4) but it does alter the 
number of new entrants and the number of pro-
ducers opting out of the insurance program. 
  Based on the overall measures of participation, 
one can conclude that farmer participation in crop 
insurance exhibits a low responsiveness to changes 
in the premium rate. However, disaggregating the 
components of overall participation illustrates 
that farmers who have not participated in the 
program during the previous two years are more 
sensitive to changes in the premium rate than 
those currently enrolled (Table 5). The elasticity 
measures indicate that a one percent increase in 
the price of insurance is associated with a 0.44 
percent decline in the number of new entrants to 
the system, while the number of dropouts in-
creases by only 0.30 percent. One explanation for 
the different responses between potentially new 
participants and current participants might be that 
the latter might have learned more about the 
benefits of the program upon their enrollment, 
which further increases their reservation pre-
mium. On the other hand, farmers who are new or 
returning to the system might need a greater price 
reduction to overcome their skepticism about the 
benefits of the system. Since the premium has a 
slightly greater influence on the number of pro-
ducers insuring their soybean crop than on those 
deciding to exit, the premium has a positive, al-
beit insignificant, effect on overall numbers in-
sured. 
  Soybean price is positively related to the total 
number of farmers with soybean crop insurance 
and the number of new entrants into the program, 
and inversely related to the number exiting the 
system. The positive effect of crop price increases 
on participation is consistent with the conceptual 
model and the findings of Hojjatti and Bockstael 
(1988). A higher crop price leads to a higher ex-
pected indemnity and consequently increases the 
value that risk-averse farmers derive from the 
hedging effect of the insurance policy. The posi-
tive sign indicates that those benefits are greater 
than the effect of price in increasing the variance 
of the indemnity. Therefore, an increase in the 
price of the crop increases the reservation pre-
mium and the participation in the insurance sys-
tem and decreases the number of farmers that 
drop out. 
  The influence of soybean price, as with the 
insurance premium, is muted at the aggregate 
level. The elasticity of the total number insured 
with respect to soybean price is 0.14 compared to 
-0.62 for those exiting the program and 1.27 for 
those entering the crop insurance plan (see Table 
5). Similar to the effect of premium rates, price is 
particularly important in the participation deci-
sion for those currently not enrolled in crop in-
surance. 
  An increase in soybean price was found to lead 
to a decline in the proportion of soybeans insured. 
The apparent paradox is due to two confounding 
effects. As noted above, a higher soybean price 
increase leads to more farmers insuring their crop. 
However, it also leads to an increase in the area 
of soybeans planted that is greater than the in-
crease in the area of soybeans insured. Conse-
quently, soybean price has an inverse effect on 
the percentage of soybean area insured. 
  The variance of soybean price has a statistically 
insignificant effect on crop insurance enrollment 102    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated Regression Coefficients Explaining Total Number of Farmers, the Number of 
New Entrants, and the Number of Exits for Soybean Crop Insurance in Ontario 
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Note: t statistics in parentheses. “+” is significant at the 10 percent level, “*” is significant at the 5 percent level, and “**” is sig-
nificant at the one percent level. 
 
when measured by total farmer participation and 
the number of dropouts. However, the number of 
soybean farmers that join the program decreases 
with the increased uncertainty around soybean 
price. The negative effect of crop price variability 
is parallel to the negative effect that profit vari-
ance has on crop insurance participation (Hojjatti 
and Bockstael 1988). Interestingly, the proportion 
of soybean acreage insured increases when farm-
ers face more uncertain soybean prices. This latter 
result might indicate that while farmers respond 
to higher price variability by reducing their total 
soybean acreage, the number of acres insured 
does not fall as rapidly or remains the same. The 
statistically insignificant effect of price variance 
on overall participation and dropout indicates that Cabas, Leiva, and Weersink  Modeling Exit and Entry of Farmers in a Crop Insurance Program   103 
 
 
Table 5. Elasticity Measures of Variables Affecting Crop Insurance Participation 
Variable  Total Insured  % of Soy Area Insured  Entrants  Exits 
PREMIUM 0.025  0.042  -0.445  0.302 
PRICE 0.143  -0.33  1.266  -0.628 
PRICEVAR -0.025  0.082  -0.220  -0.055 
YIELD 0.232  0.231  0.395  -0.913 
YIELDVAR 0.014  0.015 0.096 -0.087 
CLAIMS 0.051  0.052  0.230  -0.12 




farmers who have engaged in crop insurance 
contracts in the past will continue their enroll-
ment. In other words, farmers already enrolled do 
not reduce their demand for insurance in the face 
of higher soybean price variance, although they 
might reduce their total soybean plantings. 
  Previous yield realizations have a positive ef-
fect on insurance participation of soybean farmers 
in Ontario as measured by both aggregate partici-
pation measures. While this result is in direct con-
tradiction to the work by Goodwin (1993), it is 
consistent with the hypothesized effect discussed 
earlier in the theoretical model. Equations (9) and 
(10) outline the conditions under which increas-
ing lagged yields will lead to an increase in the 
reservation premium. The empirical results for 
Ontario confirm that the benefits of an increase in 
the base coverage level through an increase in 
lagged yield outweigh the costs of the yield in-
crease on the variance. The result highlights that 
using a moving average of the farmer’s actual 
yield to calculate the coverage yield serves to 
mute moral hazard and adverse selection prob-
lems associated with crop insurance. Farmers are 
less likely to jump out of the system as their ex-
pected coverage level increases. In contrast to 
farmers not enrolled in the program, the most 
important variable affecting the decision of farm-
ers with current enrollment is lagged yield. The 
lack of explanatory power of the regression for 
new entrants further confirms that this variable 
impacts the reservation premium via changes in 
the expected indemnity from insurance. 
  The variance of yield has a positive and statisti-
cally significant impact for the absolute measures 
of participation, although the effect disappears in 
the proportion of acres insured. The positive im-
pact of yield variability on crop insurance enroll-
ment is consistent with the theoretical model and 
with previous empirical results from Cannon and 
Barnett (1995). However, similar to the case of 
the premium rate, the impact of yield variance is 
muted at the aggregate participation measure. 
Both the coefficients and elasticities for the new 
entrants and dropouts are very similar in magni-
tude, but carry opposite signs. This variable also 
reflects the significance of weather variability in 
the insurance decision and reveals the potential 
for crop insurance as an adaptation strategy to 
climate change. 
  The number of farmers receiving indemnity 
payments in the previous period has a positive 
(negative) effect in the models explaining overall 
participation and entry (exit). The result suggests 
that potential new entrants may rely on observa-
tions of farmers currently participating in the 
system to assess the benefits of the insurance 
program. While the monetary value of claims per 
acre could have been incorporated, it is excluded 
from this study due to the high degree of correla-
tion and potential source of multicollinearity that 
this variable has with the yield variable. Similar 
to previous studies, however, the indemnity indi-
cator has a positive effect on participation. 
  The proportion of the total area planted to soy-
beans has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the total number of farmers with crop 
insurance and the number of new entrants into the 
system. The inverse effect estimated for farmers 
exiting the crop insurance program is consistent 
with previous findings (Barnett, Skees, and Houri-
gan 1990, Nieuwoudt et al. 1985). An increase in 104    April 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
the proportion of total crop area planted to soy-
beans indicates that the county is less diversified 
and farmers are more exposed to the risk of the 
dominant crop (i.e., soybeans). The elasticity meas-
ures suggest that this is one of the more important 
explanatory variables, particularly for those farm-
ers currently enrolled in the program. 
  The set of dummy variables provide a spatial 
insight on crop insurance participation. As ex-
plained above, the fixed effects model assumes 
that all the decision units respond equally to the 
exogenous variables, but that their heterogeneity 
is captured by letting the intercept vary. Using the 
total number of insured as the participation meas-
ure, the results indicate that farmers located in the 
southwestern part of the province have a substan-
tially higher degree of participation in the pro-
gram. For instance, the coefficients for Kent and 
Essex are positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that farmers in these soybean-inten-
sive counties are likely to be heavy users of crop 
insurance. In contrast, Elgin, Perth, and Haldi-
mand-Norfolk have been characterized by a more 
diversified agricultural mix, so crop insurance is 
not required as a risk management strategy to the 
same extent as in the southwest. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper we developed and tested a frame-
work to decompose crop insurance participations 
into entry and exit decisions. While the previous 
literature has established the factors affecting 
aggregate purchasing decisions, the role of the 
same factors in the dynamic components embod-
ied in exit and entry decisions is unexplored. Ap-
plying the framework to the case of the Ontario 
soybean crop insurance plan, we have established 
the importance of disaggregation to discover how 
a factor whose effect might not seem to matter 
when all participating farmers are examined might 
actually have an impact on some of the farmers, 
depending on their enrollment status. 
  The empirical findings are interesting for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is important to understand 
that not all farmers react in the same fashion to 
changes in a particular demand determinant. For 
instance, it was shown that farmers enrolled in a 
crop insurance plan are more sensitive than their 
non-enrolled counterparts to a change in the pre-
ceding year’s yield. More importantly, the results 
suggest that the number of farmers canceling their 
coverage actually declines after increases in the 
average county yield in the previous crop year. 
The implications of this finding are particularly 
relevant to crop insurance providers in that the 
practice of determining guaranteed yields based 
on the moving average of the previous years 
might actually be useful to mitigate the informa-
tion asymmetry problems inherent in yield insur-
ance contracts. Second, there are variables that 
have a symmetric effect in the exit-entry compo-
nent of participation. For instance, the results in-
dicate that although yield variability is significant 
only at the 10 percent level of significance for the 
total number of participants, the decomposition 
shows that both new entrants and dropouts are 
responsive to variable yields at the one percent 
level. This symmetric effect on the yield variabil-
ity suggests that if farmers perceive that yields are 
more likely to increase their variability, aggregate 
participation levels are likely to increase due not 
only to fewer policy cancellations, but also to 
more farmers purchasing the plan. Finally, given 
that increasing weather variance will more likely 
result in more participation, it is important for in-
surance providers to investigate the effects of this 
increasing demand in the context of projected cli-
mate change. For instance, an increase in partici-
pation might mean more financial requirements 
and greater premium adjustments, along with 
other changes that might affect the long-term fi-
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